Publicaciones | Manel Atserias Luque

Las medidas involuntarias a la luz de la CNUDPD (II parte)

Dic 28, 2018 | Publicaciones

Nota: Este artículo es una reproducción parcial del Trabajo de Fin de Máster (junio 2018) “L’internament involuntari i el tractament forçós a la llum de la Convenció de Nacions Unides sobre els drets de les persones amb discapacitat” (El internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso a la luz de la Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las personas con discapacidad). Se irá reproduciendo mensualmente este Trabajo de Fin de Máster y se incorporarán todas las actualizaciones que se estimen oportunas. La traducción del catalán al castellano ha sido efectuada por el propio autor.

2. El internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso en el modelo médico de la discapacidad

En el modelo médico de la discapacidad, ésta se identifica en el trastorno o enfermedad mental, sin tener en cuenta el entorno social (Porxas, 2015, p.81). Cabe destacar que este modelo trata a la persona con trastorno mental como un objeto que tiene que ser protegido por el Estado.

Por este motivo, los diferentes textos normativos anteriores a la CNUDPD restringen el ejercicio de determinados derechos de este colectivo. En relación con la aplicación de estas medidas involuntarias, las restricciones se producen claramente en el principio de autonomía de la voluntad y en el derecho a la libertad.

2.1. El Sistema de Naciones Unidas

Los Principios para la protección de los enfermos mentales y la mejora de la atención de la salud mental (12) permitían la aplicación del internamiento involuntario y del tratamiento forzoso. A pesar de que estos principios reconocían el trato humano y el respeto a la dignidad inherente de la persona humana (13), así como el derecho a la protección contra el maltrato físico y el trato degradante (14), se consideraba que la aplicación de estas medidas involuntarias no suponía una vulneración de derechos. Es más, como dichas medidas tenían como objetivo (i) proteger los derechos de las personas que padecían una enfermedad mental, o bien, (ii) de garantizar su mejora, la Asamblea General las excluyó del alcance de la discriminación por razón de enfermedad mental (15).

En cuanto a la aplicación del internamiento involuntario, el médico cualificado y autorizado por ley (16), además de determinar que la persona padecía una enfermedad mental, tenía que considerar si (i) aquella patología representaba un peligro para sí mismo o terceros; o bien, (ii) el hecho de no internarla podía comportar un deterioro de su salud (art. 16.1 Principios). Cabe destacar que los Principios ofrecían una regulación tanto del órgano de revisión (17) como de las garantías procesales que se necesitaban garantizar al paciente (18).

En cuanto al suministro del tratamiento forzoso, tenían que concurrir tres requisitos para que fuera conforme con los estándares internacionales de derechos humanos (Principio 11.6): en primer lugar, la persona tenía que ser internada involuntariamente; en segundo lugar, el paciente tenía que estar incapacitado para prestar o negar su consentimiento informado al plan de tratamiento propuesto; y, finalmente, la autoridad independiente tenía que comprobar que el plan de tratamiento propuesto era el más adecuado para atender las necesidades de salud del paciente.

2.2. Consejo de Europa

El art. 5.1.e del CEDH reconoce el derecho de toda persona a la libertad y a la seguridad. Sin embargo, el propio CEDH prevé una serie de supuestos en los que se puede practicar una detención a una persona. El apartado “e” hace referencia a la detención legal de personas enajenadas.

Article 5 of the Convention – Right to liberty and security

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(…)

(e) the lawful detention (…) of persons of unsound mind (…)”

Los primeros instrumentos normativos que se aprobaron en el marco del internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso fueron la Recomendación (83)2 del Comité de Ministros y la Recomendación 1235 (1994) de la Asamblea Parlamentaria.

El art. 1.2 de la Recomendación (83)2 del Comité de Ministros definió, por vez primera, lo que tenía que entenderse por internamiento involuntario: “the admission and detention for treatment of a person suffering from mental disorder (…) in a hospital, other medical establishment or appropriate place (…), the placement not being at his own request“.

Más tarde, la CEDHB aprobó una regulación en materia de consentimiento. Este tratado internacional establece, por regla general, que una intervención en el ámbito de la salud solo puede ser llevada a cabo después de que la persona haya dado su consentimiento libre e informado (art. 5).

El consentimiento está íntimamente relacionado con el derecho a la información del que dispone el paciente. Cabe poner de relieve que éste tiene que conocer el propósito y la naturaleza de la intervención, así como sus consecuencias y riesgos.

Sin embargo, se prevé una disposición específica para aquellos casos en los que la persona no sea capaz de otorgar su consentimiento (art. 6 CEDHB). Además, se contempla una regulación específica respecto a las personas who have a mental disorder. En este último colectivo, el consentimiento no deviene relevante porque se puede intervenir a una persona con trastorno mental, con independencia de si está o no de acuerdo.

Article 7 – Protection of persons who have a mental disorder

Subject to protective conditions prescribed by law, including supervisory, control and appeal procedures, a person who has a mental disorder of a serious nature may be subjected, without his or her consent, to an intervention aimed at treating his or her mental disorder only where, without such treatment, serious harm is likely to result to his or her health.

Article 8 – Emergency situation

When because of an emergency situation the appropriate consent cannot be obtained, any medically necessary intervention may be carried out immediately for the benefit of the health of the individual concerned.

El Comité de Ministros aprobó la Recomendación (2004)10 con el fin de desarrollar el artículo 7 de la CEDHB. Dicha Recomendación establece los criterios y los procedimientos que deben tener lugar para aplicar un internamiento involuntario y un tratamiento forzoso a una persona con trastorno mental.

De acuerdo con el art. 17.1 de la Recomendación (2004)10, los criterios que tienen que concurrir para que se aplique un internamiento involuntario son los siguientes: (i) la existencia de un trastorno mental, (ii) la condición de la persona representa un riesgo importante de daño grave para su salud o para otras personas; (iii) existencia de un propósito terapéutico, (iv) no hay medios menos restrictivos de proporcionar atención adecuada; y (v) la opinión de la persona afectada se ha tenido en cuenta. Los mismos criterios deben concurrir en el caso del tratamiento forzoso, excepto el relativo a la existencia de un propósito terapéutico (art. 18).

En relación con el procedimiento que debe seguirse para aplicar ambas medidas involuntarias, los apartados 1 y 2 del art. 20 de la Recomendación (2004)10 establece que a la hora de tomar una decisión el tribunal o el órgano competente debe tener en cuenta la opinión de la persona afectada; y (ii) actuar de acuerdo con los procedimientos establecidos por la ley, la cual, tiene que garantizar que la persona afectada tenga audiencia y sea consultada.

En todo caso, en aquellos supuestos en los que se ha autorizado el internamiento por un tribunal o autoridad competente, la Recomendación (2004)10 admite que la legislación nacional autorice a un facultativo, con competencia y experiencia, la aplicación de un tratamiento involuntario a la persona afectada, una vez se haya examinado y se haya tenido en cuenta su opinión (art. 20.2).

Antes de tomar la decisión, un facultativo, con competencia y experiencia, tendría que examinar a la persona afectada de acuerdo con los estándares profesionales válidos y fiables (art. 20.4). Asimismo, tendría que consultar con las personas cercanas de la persona afectada, excepto que ésta se oponga, sea inpracticable de llevarlo a cabo o fuera inapropiado por cualquier razón (art. 20.5). En todo caso, cualquier representante de la persona afectada tendría que ser informada y consultada (art. 20.6 Recomendación).

NOTAS A PIE DE PÁGINA

[12] Resolution 46/119. The protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of mental health care, adopted by the General Assembly (75th plenary meeting) on 17 December 1991.

[13] Ibid. Principle 1.2: “All persons with a mental illness, or who are being treated as such persons, shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”.

[14] Ibid. Principle 1.3: “All persons with a mental illness, or who are being treated as such persons, have the right to protection from economic, sexual and other forms of exploitation, physical or other abuse and degrading treatment”.

[15] Ibid. Principle 1.4: “There shall be no discrimination on the grounds of mental illness. (…) Special measures solely to protect the rights, or secure the advancement, of persons with mental illness shall not be deemed to be discriminatory”.

[16] De acuerdo con las definiciones de los Principios, el médico cualificado podía ser un doctor/a, psicólogo clínico, enfermero/a, trabajador/a social y cualquier otro profesional que tuviera una formación en salud mental.

[17] De acuerdo con el Principio 17.1, este órgano de revisión podía ser un órgano judicial u otro órgano independiente e imparcial, según lo que estableciera la legislación nacional.

[18] Entre otras garantías procesales que se reconocen al paciente (Principio 18), se destacan las siguientes: (i) nombrar a un defensor; (ii) solicitar y presentar en audiencia un dictamen independiente sobre su salud mental, así como todas las pruebas que fueran pertinentes, (iii) obtener copias del expediente del paciente, excepto que fuera perjudicial para éste o terceros; (iv) asistir personalmente a la audiencia donde se tome la decisión de su internamiento, así como participar y ser escuchada; y (v) solicitar la presencia de una determinada persona siempre que no supusiera un perjuicio para el paciente o terceros.

Nota adicional: En aras de facilitar la lectura, se incluye en esta nota adicional la referencia del trabajo de Maria Àngels Porxas Roig lo podéis encontrar aquí: Porxas Roig, M. Àngels, El tractament legal del malalt mental en els instruments internacionals de drets humans. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015 (Premi de Recerca en Drets Humans, 6)

Why do I defend the resistance theory?

Dic 23, 2018 | Publicaciones

Note: This article was written in 2015 and published at the second edition of European Law Students’ Association Spain Law Review (2017). The current opinion of the author has changed over time. The next paper related to this issue, the reader will be able to identify the differences.

Manel Atserias Luque (1)

Abstract

Unlike engagement and convergence postures, the resistance theory has full constitutional legitimacy. American courts (especially the U.S. Supreme Court) should never use and cite the foreign law or foreign judicial decisions to interpret the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. The main reason to defend this assertion is logical: these foreign materials do not have democratic legitimacy. American people have not elected either those lawmakers or judges from other countries. Therefore, their legislation or judgments are irrelevant.
Keywords: resistance theory, constitutional legitimacy, checks and balances, democratic theory, originalist interpretive theory

Resumen

A diferencia de las posturas del compromiso y convergencia, la teoría de la resistencia tiene plena legitimidad constitucional. Los tribunales americanos (especialmente el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos) nunca debería utilizar ni citar el derecho extranjero o las resoluciones judiciales extranjeras para interpretar el significado de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos. La razón principal para defender esta afirmación es lógica: estos materiales extranjeros no tienen legitimidad democrática. El pueblo americano no ha elegido a los legisladores ni a los jueces de otros países. Por lo tanto, su legislación o jurisprudencia son irrelevantes.
Palabras clave: teoría de la resistencia, legitimidad constitucional, frenos y contrapesos, teoría democrática, teoría interpretativa originalista.

1. Introduction

One of the most important and exciting questions in the field of comparative constitutional law is whether domestic constitutional courts or supreme courts with judicial review should use and cite the foreign law or foreign court decisions to interpret national constitutions.

This debate has taken place in both US Supreme Court and US Congress, although it is not exclusive to this country. Nonetheless, this essay focuses on analyzing this legal question in the context of US legal system, considering that I have studied this topic as from US Supreme Court opinions, legal scholarship, bills, confirmation hearings, and other materials. (2)

The first section consists of two parts, namely: firstly, it briefly analyzes current postures on this topic ―resistance, engagement, and convergence― so that the reader can better understand this academic and legal discussion. Secondly, it refers to some important events as of Roper v. Simmons opinion in the US.

The second section shows my view about this topic. Unlike professors Victor Ferreres Comella and Vicki C. Jackson, who support engagement posture, (3) I am a supporter of resistance theory. For this reason, this paper does not intend to be neutral and focuses on exposing the legal (and more precisely, constitutional) foundations of this posture. In particular, I will take into account the democratic theory and originalist interpretation of the US Constitution.

2. The General Framework of this Academic and Legal Discussion in the US

2.1. Brief Mention to the Three Current Postures concerning the Use of Foreign Legal Materials

In accordance with Vicki C. Jackson’s book, (4) there are three current postures concerning the use of foreign legal materials: resistance, engagement, and convergence.

According to the resistance theory, domestic courts interpreting their Constitution must reject foreign legal materials when dealing with constitutional issues. US Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito are supporters of this posture. (5)

As per the engagement posture, domestic courts may use and cite the transnational law to interpret their Constitution. There is a ‘light version’, known as deliberative, which promotes that judges may consider both foreign law and international law as a permissive source when deciding constitutional issues. There is also a ‘hard version’, known as relational, (6) which considers that judges must consider the transnational law materials. In both categories, judges are not required to follow foreign legal precedent. Justices Stephen Breyer and Anthony M. Kennedy defend this posture.

Lastly, the convergence model suggests that judges must interpret the national constitution in the light of the transnational law.

2.2. Resistance movement: first reactions after Roper v. Simmons opinion

2.2.1. Roper v. Simmons

Roper v. Simmons opinion,(7) which was delivered by Justice Kennedy and decided on 1 March 2005, generated much controversy in American society. Before explaining its first reactions, it is necessary to summarize this case to understand its constitutional importance.

Simmons planned and committed a capital murder when he was 17. He was tried and sentenced to death. After Atkins v. Virginia opinion,(8) on which US Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded person under Eighth(9) and Fourteenth(10) Amendments, Simmons filed a new petition(11) for state postconviction relief before the Missouri Supreme Court. This court held that since Stanford v. Kentucky(12) “a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders” and accordingly it set aside Simmons’ death sentence and resentenced him to “life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor.”

The key question, in this case, was to determine whether it was constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution to execute a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime.

After analyzing whether there was a change of the national consensus in US, bearing in mind American precedents and legislatures on this legal question, US Supreme Court used and cited foreign law to interpret the Eighth Amendment.(13)(14) It held that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed” and it upheld the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court.

Justice Scalia, with the support of Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, formulated a dissenting opinion. He did not agree with Kennedy on the use of foreign law to determine the meaning of Eighth Amendment.(15)

2.2.2. Scalia (resistance) v. Breyer (deliberative engagement)

It is very illustrative to read the informal discussion between US Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Breyer on the validity of using the foreign material on constitutional issues,(16) which took place at the American University Washington College of Law on 13 January 2005.

In this conversation, the reader can clearly identify two of three existing postures concerning above mentioned legal question: while Scalia defends resistance theory, Breyer is a supporter of deliberative engagement position.

This conversation was not merely an academic discussion. Behind this, there was a legal debate between US Supreme Court Justices,(17) which can be seen in Roper v. Simmons opinion.

After Dorsen’s first questions,(18) Justice Scalia answered with an amusing comment, which clearly symbolized his position on that subject.(19) His speech analyzed several positive ingredients of resistance theory that I want to emphasize. Firstly, he stressed that American people have its own moral and legal framework.(20) He referred to the Federalist Papers to determine the differences between US and European countries.(21) Secondly, Scalia highlighted the selective use of foreign law when some American judges decide constitutional issues,(22) citing Lawrence v. Texas.(23) Lastly, he asserted that there is a difference between writing and interpreting a Constitution. While the former is appropriate to use foreign law, the latter is not.(24)

Breyer also began his speech with a funny comment, which refuted Scalia’s first assertion.(25) He explained a personal anecdote that reflected this academic and legal discussion between resistance and engagement supporters.(26) He repeated ad nauseam that decisions of foreign courts do not bind American courts and there was no problem to take into account this foreign material.

2.2.3. Legislative reaction: “Constitution Restoration Act” and “American Justice for American Citizens Act”

Roper v. Simmons was decided on 1 March 2005. Two days after, US Senator Richard C. Shelby and Representative Robert B. Aderholt, among others who support them, introduced a Bill each one to limit the jurisdiction of Federal courts in certain cases and promote federalism, known also as “Constitution Restoration Act of 2005” (henceforth, CRA), in the US Senate(27) and the US House of the Representatives.(28) In accordance with Section 201 CRA, American courts “may not rely upon” foreign law or foreign court decisions to interpret and apply the US Constitution.(29) The purpose of these bills, which were not finally enacted, was “[to protect and preserve] the Constitution of the United States by restricting federal courts from recognizing the laws of foreign jurisdictions and international law as the supreme law of our land.”(30)

Moreover, in order to dissuade American judges from using and citing foreign legal material, CRA stated that they could be removed upon impeachment and conviction.(31)

Later, Representative Ronald Ernest “Ron” Paul introduced a Bill to ensure that the courts interpret the Constitution in the manner that the Framers intended, also known as “American Justice for American Citizens Act” (henceforth, AJACA),(32) in the US House of Representatives on 14 April 2005. The Section 3 AJACA also prohibited American judges from using and applying foreign law and foreign court decisions to interpret the US Constitution. This bill was not either enacted.

2.2.4. Confirmation hearings: Roberts and Alito before the U.S. Senate

In the hearing on the nomination of John G. Roberts JR. to be Chief Justice of the United States,(33) before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, which took place between 12-15 September 2005, Senator Kyl Jon asked him about the role of foreign law in US Supreme Court decisions.(34) Kyl, who defends the democratic theory,(35) referred to two cases (Roper v. Simmons and Knight v. Florida) to show his concern on this judicial practice.

Roberts used democratic theory to answer Senator Kyl’s question.(36) Moreover, he showed his concern on using foreign precedent because it enlarges the discretional power of judges.(37)

In the hearing on the nomination of Samuel A. Alito, JR. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,(38) which took place between 9-13 January 2006, Senator Kyl asked the same. Alito said that foreign law is not helpful to interpret the U.S. Constitution.(39)

3. The constitutional legitimacy of the resistance theory: Scalia’s originalism and textualism

Although these foreign materials are not binding on American courts (deliberative and relational engagement), the mere fact of citing and using them on judicial decisions violates clearly the principle of separation of powers(40) and democratic government.

When some American judge cites and uses the foreign law or foreign court decisions to interpret the US Constitution, it is necessary to ask him or her the following questions: who has voted this foreign law? Who is accountable to the American citizens? Why has he or she cited and used only this specific foreign material (for example, French case-law) and not another when interpreting the US Constitution?

Judges should take into account that citing and using foreign material is irrelevant to decide American constitutional issues.(41) Furthermore, this judicial practice increases the discretional power of American judges, which is initially limited by American precedent. This scenario undermines legal certainty, so long as citizens will not be able to know how an American court resolves a specific case. We are probably before the most perverse and sophisticated judicial practice which main purpose is to replace American people’s will with the judge view, and this is very dangerous in a democracy.

I agree with Justice Scalia on the distinction between writing and interpreting a Constitution. In order to determine the original meaning of any Constitution, it is necessary to take into account when this legal document was adopted by its framers. As a result of this theory, it is not appropriate to use foreign legal material when American judges decide constitutional issues. It is not only irrelevant, but it can be harmful to American people. If an American judge cites and uses the foreign material, it seems that the Supreme law of this country does not have sufficient “force” or “personality” to offer a legal answer before American legal disputes.

However, it is important to distinguish between constitutional issues (for example, fundamental or constitutional rights) and other topics, such as foreign investment, which may be regulated by treaties. In this case, taking into account that the American people, through US Congress, have consented to join this international agreement, American judges are authorized to pay attention how parties’ courts have decided one particular case under a treaty.

Lastly, I would like to add as follows: Firstly, although some assert that support the resistance theory is provincial and narrow-minded (I am sorry but I cannot share this opinion), it is perfectly compatible to defend this theory and at the same time to be interested in analyzing the field of comparative constitutional law. For example, an American judge can study a specific foreign law to participate in an academic debate with other judges or publish a paper establishing the differences between foreign constitutional law and his or her own. But when this judge must decide one case in accordance with his or her Constitution, he or she should never use foreign law or foreign court decisions to interpret it.

Secondly, although conspiracy theories are very entertaining, I do not think they are good enough reasons to support the resistance theory. The Western dominance or international elite, whose purpose is to impose its decisions on other countries (in this case, U.S.), are ridiculous. If someone wants to defend this theory through these reasons, it is better that he or she immediately leaves this academic and legal discussion.

Footnotes

(1) I want to dedicate this essay to Ms Sonia Hermosilla Díaz, Ms Marta García Gravi, and Ms Aida Ferrer Mitjavila. Thanks to these incredible women, the group ELSA-Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) has been possible. In addition, I also want to inscribe this essay to my parents ―Mr Manuel Atserias Gracia and Mrs Marta Beatriz Luque Llaosa―, doctors ―Ms Blanca Bueno Julià-Capmany and Ms Maria del Pino Alonso Ortega―, and my best friend, Mr. Tomás Gabriel Garcia i Micó. All of them are helping me to fight against my disease: Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD).

(2) Bearing in mind that I am very critical with interpretative tools used by the European Court of Human Rights, I consider appropriate to analyze this legal discussion in another context.

(3) Víctor F. Comella, Comparative Modesty. A Review of Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era, by Vicki Jackson, European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 7, Issue 3 (2011), pp. 517-528. Professor Comella asserts that he is “deeply sympathetic with the engagement model that Jackson has articulated in this book.”

(4) Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era, 2010.

(5) The late Associate Justice Antonin Gregory Scalia, who died in February 2016, was also an ardent supporter of this theory.

(6) American judges do not follow this posture. Nonetheless, other countries have expressly recognized it in their constitutions. For instance, according to Article 39.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (b) must consider international law, and (c) may consider foreign law.

(7) Roper v. Simmons (03-633) 543 U.S. 551 (2005)

(8) Atkins v. Virginia (00-8452) 536 U.S. 304 (2002): “Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with the judgment of ‘the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter’ and concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency’, we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.”

(9) US Constitution Amendment VIII provides that “[E]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

(10) Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Amendment VIII is applicable to the States. The US Supreme Court cited Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666— 667 (1962) and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (plurality opinion) to justify this interpretation.

(11) Simmons firstly filed a motion for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance at trial. This motion was rejected.

(12) Stanford v. Kentucky (No. 87-5765).

(13) Roper v. Simmons: “Yet at least from the time of the Court’s decision in Trop [v. Dulles], the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.” Moreover, US Supreme Court added that “Respondent and his amici have submitted, and petitioner does not contest, that only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. Since then each of these countries has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice. Brief for Respondent 49—50. In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”

(14) Trop v. Dulles (No. 70) 356 U.S. 86: “The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime”; Atkins v. Virginia: “within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”; Thompson v. Oklahoma (No. 86-6169) 487 U.S. 815: “[w]e have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual”; Enmund v. Florida (No. 81-5321) 458 U.S. 782: “the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.”; Coker v. Georgia (No. 75-5444) 433 U.S. 584: “It is (…) not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue.”

(15) Scalia’s dissenting opinion (Roper v. Simmons): “The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation’s moral standards―and in the course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.”

(16) Norman Dorsen, The relevance of foreign legal materials in U.S. constitutional cases: A conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer; Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law 2005, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 3, Number 4, 2005, pp. 519-541.

(17) Marc C. Rahdert, Comparative constitutional advocacy, The American University Law Review, 56 Am. U.L. Rev. 553 (2007), pp. 554-665: “As the nation soon learned, Justices Breyer and Scalia’s […] conversation was not purely academic exchange. Behind this discussion (known to them though not yet to us) was the Supreme Court’s pending decision in Roper v. Simmons.”

(18) Ibid. at 16. Among all formulated questions from the beginning, maybe the clearest and straightforward question was as follows: “(…) is appropriate for our [American] judges to use and cite to foreign materials in the course of deciding constitutional cases?”

(19) Ibid. at 16. “Well, most of those questions should be addressed to Justice Breyer because I do not use foreign law in the interpretation of the United States Constitution.”

(20) Ibid. at 16. “But we don’t have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world, and never have.”

(21) Ibid. at 16. “If you read the Federalist Papers, they are full of statements that make very clear the framers didn’t have a whole lot of respect for many of the rules in European countries. Madison, for example, speaks contemptuously of the countries of continental Europe, ‘who are afraid to let their people bear arms.

(22) Ibid. at 16. “When it agrees with what the justices would like the case to say, we use the foreign law, and when it doesn’t agree we don’t use it.”

(23) Lawrence et al. v. Texas (02-102) 539 U.S. 558 (2003)

(24) Ibid. at 16. “Why is it that foreign law would be relevant to what an American judge does when he interprets ―interprets, not writes― the Constitution? Of course the founders used a lot of foreign law. If you read the Federalist Papers, it’s full of discussions of the Swiss system, the German system, etc. It’s full of that because comparison with the practices of other countries is very useful in devising a constitution. But why is it useful in interpreting one?”

(25) Ibid. at 16. “I think my law clerk found a case where Justice Scalia referred to foreign law.”

(26) Ibid. at 16. “The best example arose at a seminar where several professors, a member of Congress, a senator, and another judge and I were discussing the relations among the branches of government. The congressman began to criticize the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law in its decisions (…) I said to the congressman, ‘If I have a difficult case and a human being called a judge, though of a different country, has had to consider a similar problem, why should I not read what that judge has said? It will not bind me, but I may learn something. The congressman replied, ‘Fine, you are right. Read it. Just don’t cite it in your opinion’.”

(27) S.520 — 109th Congress (2005-2006) U.S. Senate: https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senatebill/520/all-info(last visited on 27 February 2017).

(28) H.R.1070 — 109th Congress (2005-2006) the House of the Representatives of the United States: https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/1070/all-info (last visited on 27 February 2017). 267 Section 201 CRA, called “The interpretation of the Constitution”, stated that “In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of the United States may not rely upon any constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign state or international organization or agency, other than English constitutional and common law up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.”

(29) Section 201 CRA, called “The interpretation of the Constitution”, stated that “In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of the United States may not rely upon any constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign state or international organization or agency, other than English constitutional and common law up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.”

(30) Judge Rooy More’s statement in an interview: http://www.waff.com/Global/story.asp?S=1644862 (last visited on December 14, 2015). Although CRA was originally introduced in 2004, the purpose of these bills were the same in 2005.

(31) Section 302 CRA, called “Impeachment, conviction, and removal of judges for certain extrajurisdictional activities”, provided that “To the extent that a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States or any judge of any Federal court engages in any activity that exceeds the jurisdiction of the court of that justice or judge, as the case may be, by reason of section 1260 or 1370 of title 28, United States Code, as added by this Act, engaging in that activity shall be deemed to constitute the commission of (1) an offense for which the judge may be removed upon impeachment and conviction; and (2) a breach of the standard of good behaviour required by article III, section 1 of the Constitution.

(32) H.R.1658 — 109th Congress (2005-2006): https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/housebill/1658/text?q=%7B”search”%3A%5B”American+Justice+for+Americans+Citizens+Act”%5D%7D&res ultIndex=6 (last visited on 27 February 2017). In accordance with Section 3 AJACA Bill, “Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor any lower Federal court shall, in the purported exercise of judicial power to interpret and apply the Constitution of the United States, employ the constitution, laws, administrative rules, executive orders, directives, policies, or judicial decisions of any international organization or foreign state, except for the English constitutional and common law or other sources of law relied upon by the Framers of the Constitution of the United States”.

(33) Confirmation hearing on the nomination of John G. Roberts, JR. to be Chief Justice of the United States before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (available in https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS/pdf/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf).

(34) Ibid. at 33. “What, if anything, is the proper role of foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions? Of course we are not talking about interpreting treaties or foreign contracts, but cases such as those that would involve interpretations of the U.S. Constitution?”

(35) Ibid. at 33. “Our Constitution was drafted by the Nation’s Founders, ratified by the States, and amended repeatedly through our constitutional processes that involve both Federal and State legislators. It is an American Constitution, not a European or an African or an Asian one, and its meaning, it seems to me, by definition, cannot be determined by reference to foreign law.”

(36) Ibid. at 33. “Judicial decisions in this country ―judges of course are not accountable to the people, but we are appointed through a process that allows for participation of the electorate, the President who nominates judges is obviously accountable to the people. The Senators who confirm judges are accountable to the people. In that way the role of the judge is consistent with the democratic theory. If we’re relying on a decision from a German judge about what our Constitution means, no President accountable to the people appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that judge, and yet he’s playing a role in shaping a law that binds the people in this country.”

(37) Ibid. at 33. “The other part of it that would concern me is that relying on foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges. It doesn’t limit their discretion the way relying on domestic precedent does. Domestic precedent can confine and shape the discretion of the judges. In foreign law you can find anything you want. (…) And that actually expands the discretion of the judge. It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them with the authority of precedent because they’re finding precedent in foreign law, and use that to determine the meaning of the Constitution. I think that’s a misuse of precedent, not a correct use of precedent.”

(38) Confirmation hearing on the nomination of Samuel A. Alito, JR. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (available in https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg25429/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25429.pdf).

(39) Ibid. at 38. “I don’t think that foreign law is helpful in interpreting the Constitution. (…) As for the protection of individual rights, I think that we should look to our own Constitution and our own precedents. (…) We have our own law, we have our own traditions, we have our own precedents, and we should look to that in interpreting our Constitution.

(40) I represent checks and balances system with a ‘perfect triangle’, which reflects that each power controls and is controlled by each other for the purposes of avoiding the abuse of power. In the case of Judicial Branch, US Supreme Court can declare unconstitutional both laws of US Congress and presidential acts. In compensation for this power, judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Moreover, judges can be impeached by US Congress, as well as removing them from office whether impeachment is passed.

(41) If they are interested in using and citing foreign materials, he can write books that illustrate comparative constitutional law analysis. I will be delighted to buy them and study them because I also like it.

Bibliography

Articles and Books

Comella, V F. Comparative Modesty. A Review of Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era, by Vicki Jackson, European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 7, Issue 3 (2011).
Jackson, V J. Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era, 2010.
Dorsen, N. The relevance of foreign legal materials in U.S. constitutional cases: A conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer; Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law 2005, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 3, Number 4, 2005.
Rahdert, M C. Comparative constitutional advocacy, The American University Law Review, 56 Am. U.L. Rev. 553 (2007), pp. 554-665.

Case law

Roper v. Simmons (03-633) 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Atkins v. Virginia (00-8452) 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Trop v. Dulles (No. 70) 356 U.S. 86.
Thompson v. Oklahoma (No. 86-6169) 487 U.S. 815.
Enmund v. Florida (No. 81-5321) 458 U.S. 782.
Coker v. Georgia (No. 75-5444) 433 U.S. 584.

Bills

520 — 109th Congress (2005-2006) A bill to limit the jurisdiction of Federal courts in certain cases and promote federalism. [also known as «Constitution Restoration Act of 2005»].
R.1070 — 109th Congress (2005-2006) To limit the jurisdiction of Federal courts in certain cases and promote federalism. [also known «Constitution Restoration Act of 2005»].
R.1658 — 109th Congress (2005-2006) To ensure that the courts interpret the Constitution in the manner that the Framers intended. [also known «American Justice for Americans Citizens Act»].

Other materials

HRG. 109–158 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, JR. To Be Chief Justice of the United States Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate September 12-15, Serial No. J–109–37.
HRG. 109–277 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, JR. To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, January 9-13, Serial No. J–109–56.

International Business Transactions

Nov 27, 2018 | Publicaciones

NOTE: This brief remark on International Business Transactions has been created by Mr. Manel Atserias Luque on May 28th, 2017. The author has used some Professor Franco Ferrari’s quotes, which are indicated with «…».

Levels of unification of law (unification process)

1st. Uniform substantive law

1.1. Unlimited uniform substantive law

– Convention providing a uniform law for bills of exchange and promissory notes of 7 June 1930

– Convention providing a uniform law for checks of 19 March 1931

1.2. Limited uniform substantive law

– United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG)

– UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring (Ottawa, 28 May 1988)

– UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing (Ottawa, 28 May 1988)

2nd. Uniform private international law

Stages of the comunitarization of the (European Union) private international law of obligations

a) Contractual Obligations

– 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (The Rome Convention)

– Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation)

b) Non-Contractual Obligations

– Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II Regulation)

International Uniform Law

1. Positive and negative approach

The international uniform law is «a set of identically worded legal rules that are binding on a general level in at least two jurisdictions where they are supposed to be interpreted and applied in the same manner» [positive approach]. One of the most important features of international uniform law is «the intended identity of the legal rules» (animus unificandi) created by states. Lawmakers want this uniform law to be interpreted and applied in the same manner in an international context.

It is necessary that there is always an animus unificandi among states to refer to the international uniform law. Therefore, the harmonized law, which is only created to reduce (not to remove) the existing differences among legal rules of different jurisdictions, is not part of this category [negative approach]. Furthermore, some hypotheticals ―such as (i) the identity (e.g. same worded legal rules) among laws of different jurisdictions, and (ii) the unilateral reception (receiving state) of foreign legal rules (model state)― cannot be considered uniform law either because there is no an intentional creation among states. In all cases, each judge will interpret and apply the legal rules through his or her domestic concepts and interpretative methods.

Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that a ‘pure’ uniform law does not and will not exist ever. We must consider that most UN international agreements are drafted in different official languages. Furthermore, if national courts of contracting states must interpret and apply these international legal rules, there will always be a certain degree of divergence.

For this reason, Professor Ferrari is right when he says that «the starting point for determining whether there is uniform law is the degree of intended similarity of the legal rules in question».

2. Levels of unification of law

Depending on the topic and purpose, there are two different levels of unification of law: the first one is the international uniform substantive law, which can be unlimited or limited. The second one is the uniform private international law.

As to the uniform substantive law, it is important to distinguish two subtypes of unification, which also have a different level of impact regarding the unification process:

On the one hand, the unlimited uniform substantive law is the set of legal rules that applies to both domestic and international situations. Therefore, the judge of the forum will apply the same substantive law in both cases, regardless of there is or not an internationality element in the dispute. This is the maximum level of unification, but it is very strange to find this kind of international agreements. Some examples are the ‘Convention providing a uniform law for bills of exchange and promissory notes of 7 June 1930’ and ‘the Convention providing a uniform law for checks of 19 March 1931’.

On the other hand, the limited uniform substantive law is the set of legal rules that solely governs international situations. The judge of the forum will only apply these legal rules to trans-border cases ―in other words, situations connected to more than one country―. Therefore, if the dispute is domestic, the interpreter will only use the national law to resolve the case. Some examples are the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG), and UNIDROIT Conventions on International Factoring and on Financial Leasing (Ottawa, 28 May 1988).

Lastly, the uniform private international law (conflict of laws) is the set of legal rules that determine what substantive law the judge of the forum has to apply to resolve the case. In other words, the uniform private international law does not provide a substantive solution to decide the dispute.

Both levels of unification of law have a common purpose, namely: «to avoid the unequal treatment to which the application of different legal rules may lead in a specific instance». Nonetheless, the intensity of these categories of uniform law will be different depending on what concrete goal lawmakers want to achieve. While the uniform substantive law provides a substantive solution to resolve a situation directly, the uniform private international law determines what substantive law the judge of the forum will have to apply to decide the case (conflict of law).

The most desirable situation for individuals and companies in the business area is, of course, the uniform substantive law. This unification of substantive legal rules strengthens the legal certainty, reduces forum shopping, and transactions costs.

El caso de las titulaciones federativas de baloncesto en Cataluña queda resuelto definitivamente por el TC

Nov 26, 2018 | Publicaciones

NOTA: Este artículo fue publicado el pasado día 22 de agosto de 2017 en el medio IUSPORT, plataforma internacional especializada en Derecho Deportivo. Teniendo en cuenta que el régimen temporal de suspensión de la vigencia del régimen sancionador aplicable a las infracciones administrativas previstas tanto en los apartados 1 (excepto letras c y d) y 3 del artículo 13 de la Ley 3/2008 termina el próximo día 1 de enero de 2019, he considerado oportuno publicarlo en la página web.

El caso de las titulaciones federativas de baloncesto en Cataluña (#NoPayNoCoach) queda resuelto definitivamente por el Tribunal Constitucional

El Tribunal Constitucional, en su Sentencia 102/2017, de 20 de julio, declaró recientemente que el artículo 8 de la Ley de Cataluña 7/2015, de 14 de mayo, de modificación de la Ley 3/2008, del ejercicio de las profesiones del deporte (en adelante, Ley 7/2015), el cual resuelve el caso #NoPayNoCoach, es constitucional. Por lo tanto, los entrenadores catalanes de baloncesto con titulaciones federativas ya pueden inscribirse en el Registro Oficial de Profesionales del Deporte de Cataluña (ROPEC) con plenas garantías jurídicas.

Aunque el Tribunal Constitucional permitiera la inscripción de nuestro colectivo en el ROPEC hace poco más de un año (Auto de 5 julio de 2016), lo cierto es que esta actuación quedaba condicionada a la posterior sentencia del citado Tribunal. Es decir, podíamos cantar victoria, pero con prudencia. Todavía no se había resuelto el fondo de la cuestión litigiosa. Pero ahora sí. Ya es definitivo. Podemos hablar de una victoria definitiva en lo que se refiere a la cuestión de regularizar nuestras titulaciones federativas.

Cabe destacar que la inscripción en el ROPEC es obligatoria, tal como se desprende de la redacción del artículo 8.1 de la Ley 3/2008, de 23 de abril, del ejercicio de las profesiones del deporte (en adelante, Ley 3/2008). Además, conforme el artículo 13.1.b de la Ley 3/2008, en relación con el artículo 74.d de la Ley del Deporte (Decreto Legislativo 1/2000, de 31 de julio), la actividad de no inscribirse en el ROPEC constituye una infracción administrativa de carácter grave.

Pero, tranquilos. No hay que alarmarse. El legislador catalán, como ya hizo en su momento, nos ha concedido un plazo generoso para podernos inscribir en el ROPEC sin ser sancionados por la vía administrativa.

En efecto, de acuerdo con la disposición transitoria séptima de la Ley 3/2008 ―se añadió por el artículo 222.3 de la Ley de Cataluña 5/2017, de 28 de marzo, de medidas fiscales, administrativas, financieras y del sector público y de creación y regulación de los impuestos sobre grandes establecimientos comerciales, sobre estancias en establecimientos turísticos, sobre elementos radiotóxicos, sobre bebidas azucaradas envasadas y sobre emisiones de dióxido de carbono―, la cual, aprobó un nuevo régimen temporal de suspensión de la vigencia del régimen sancionador aplicable a las infracciones administrativas previstas tanto en los apartados 1 (excepto letras c y d) y 3 del artículo 13 de la Ley 3/2008, se establece un nuevo plazo para inscribirse en el ROPEC: desde el 1 de enero de 2017 hasta el 1 de enero de 2019.

Dicho de otro modo: la Administración de la Generalitat de Cataluña podrá sancionarnos por no estar inscrito en el ROPEC después del día 1 de enero de 2019. Hasta esa fecha, no pueden sancionarnos por dicha circunstancia.

Sin perjuicio de analizar a fondo la STC 102/2017 en otro artículo ―su extensión lo hace aconsejable―, he considerado oportuno hacer hincapié en una cuestión muy específica que ha afectado a los intereses de miles de entrenadores catalanes de baloncesto.

Para inscribirse en el ROPEC, podéis seguir las instrucciones que, en su momento, publicó la Federación Catalana de Baloncesto: https://www.basquetcatala.cat/document/getdocument/1146 (este enlace ha sido actualizado)

Las medidas involuntarias a la luz del CNUDPD

Nov 25, 2018 | Publicaciones

Abstract (1)

La Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad (en adelante, CNUDPD) ha supuesto un cambio de paradigma en el tratamiento jurídico de la discapacidad. En efecto, tras la firma y la ratificación de este tratado internacional, el modelo médico de la discapacidad (perspectiva asistencial) ha sido sustituido por un modelo social. Este último, basado en los derechos humanos, ya no concibe las personas con discapacidad como a objetos de derecho, sino como a sujetos de derecho.

Abstract

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (henceforth, UNCRPD) has meant a paradigm shift in the legal treatment of disability. Indeed, since the signing and ratification of this international treaty, the medical model of disability (healthcare perspective) has been replaced by a social model. The latter, based on human rights, no longer conceives people with disabilities as objects of law, but as subjects of law.

Title: The involuntary placement and the forced treatment in the light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Palabras clave: personas con trastorno mental, internamiento involuntario, tratamiento forzoso

Keywords: persons with mental disorder, involuntary placement, compulsory treatment

1. Introducción

Tras la aprobación de la Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las personas con discapacidad, hecha en Nueva York, el 13 de diciembre de 2006, ratificada por instrumento de 23 de noviembre de 2007 (BOE nº 96, de 21.4.2008) (en adelante, CNUDPD) [2]; y su Protocolo Facultativo (BOE nº 97, de 22.4.2008) (en adelante, PFCNUDPD)[3] , determinadas prácticas médicas[4] aplicadas a las personas con trastorno mental, como son el internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso (contención mecánica, aislamiento y medicación forzosa, entre otras), en los centros psiquiátricos y en las unidades psiquiátricas de los hospitales generales se han convertido en medidas controvertidas desde la perspectiva de los derechos humanos.

Paralelamente, hay una cuestión que no es demasiado clara. Se trata de determinar el nombre del colectivo al cual van dirigidas estas medidas involuntarias:

a) En el ámbito del sistema de Naciones Unidas, mientras el artículo 1 de la CNUDPD utiliza la expresión persons with disabilities, el Comité sobre los derechos de las personas con discapacidad (en adelante, Comité de la CNUDPD) ya distingue entre persons with intellectual disabilities y persons with psychosocial disabilities en sus comentarios y observaciones.

b) En el ámbito del Consejo de Europa, el artículo 5.1.e del Convenio europeo para la protección de los derechos humanos y de las libertades fundamentales, de 4 de noviembre de 1950, ratificado por instrumento de 26 de septiembre de 1970 (BOE nº 243, de 10.10.1979 (en adelante, CEDH) se refiere a persons of unsound mind. Más tarde, el artículo 7 del Convenio europeo para la protección de los derechos humanos y la dignidad del ser humano respecto a las aplicaciones de la biología y la medicina, hecho en Oviedo el 4 de abril de 1997 y ratificado por España por Instrumento de 23 de julio de 1999 (BOE nº 251, de 20.10.1999) (en adelante, CEDHB) utiliza la expresión persons who have a mental disorder.

En cuanto a las recomendaciones adoptadas por el Comité de Ministros y la Asamblea Parlamentaria del Consejo de Europa, la terminología también ha ido variando con el paso del tiempo y no es uniforme:

En relación con el Comité de Ministros, se encuentran las expresiones (i) persons suffering mental disorder en la Recomendación Nº. R(83)2 [5]; (ii) persons with mental disorder en la Recomendación nº REC(2004)10 [6] ; y, recientemente, persons with disabilities.

Respecto a la Asamblea Parlamentaria, se utilizó la expresión persons suffering from personality disorders en la Recomendación 1235 (1994) [7] y, recientemente, persons with psychosocial disabilities en la Recomendación 2091 (2016) [8].

Asimismo, la distinción entre persons with intellectual disabilities y persons with psychosocial disabilities es utilizada también por las principales organizaciones no gubernamentales que participan, a pesar de los obstáculos, en los procesos de consulta pública: European Disability Forum, European Network of (ex-)Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, Autism Europe, Inclusion Europe, Mental Health Europe y la International Disability Alliance.

c) En el ámbito español, el artículo 1 del Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2013, de 29 de noviembre, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley general de derechos de las personas con discapacidad y de su inclusión social (BOE nº 289, de 3.12.2013) (en adelante, RDL 1/2013) hace referencia a las “personas con discapacidad”.

Aunque el autor es partidario de utilizar el término persons with mental problems a la hora de referirse al colectivo que se les aplica estas medidas involuntarias, al ser menos estigmatizante, en este trabajo de investigación se utiliza la terminología que utiliza últimamente el Comité de Bioética del Consejo de Europa: persons with mental disorder.

Ante este cambio de paradigma provocado por la CNUDPD, el internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso fueron medidas aceptadas mayoritariamente atendiendo a la finalidad última de éstas: proteger a la persona con trastorno mental y a la comunidad. Es, por eso, que una breve evolución de la normativa internacional y europea es necesaria para apreciar cuáles han sido las diferencias más sustanciales.

Teniendo en cuenta que no hay una posición común a nivel internacional (Gurbal, Martin, 2018, p. 3) [9] ni europeo sobre si estas medidas involuntarias son o no compatibles con los actuales estándares de derechos humanos, es fundamental identificar en segundo lugar cuáles son las distintas corrientes de pensamiento.

En el ámbito del Consejo de Europa, la problemática ha adquirido más eco después de que el Comité de Bioética, con el apoyo del Comité de Ministros, acordó la aprobación de un protocolo adicional al CEDHB con el fin de establecer los criterios y los procedimientos de internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso [10]. Esta actuación, sin embargo, ya ha sido rechazada por la propia Asamblea Parlamentaria, entre otros órganos.

En el caso español, la aplicación de estas medidas involuntarias es reconocida tanto por la legislación como la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional. Sin embargo, el Comité de la CNUDPD ha recomendado en diversas ocasiones la modificación de la legislación nacional vigente a las autoridades españolas con el fin de adaptarse a los estándares internacionales de derechos humanos.

Finalmente, se trata de dar respuesta razonada a las siguientes cuestiones [11]:

a) ¿El internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso son medidas compatibles con los actuales estándares internacionales de derechos humanos?

b) ¿Cuál ha de ser la posición del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y del Tribunal Constitucional ante esta problemática teniendo en cuenta que el legislador pretende regular (europeo) o mantener (español) la aplicación del internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso?

NOTAS A PIE DE PÁGINA

[1] El autor de este Trabajo de Fin de Máster ha podido constatar que las estructuras rígidas de su Trastorno Obsesivo Compulsivo continúan siendo obstáculos relevantes para la realización efectiva de una tarea de investigación. Este trabajo no hace justicia de las centenares de horas dedicadas a la lectura y estudio de esta materia.

Precisamente, por este motivo, me gustaría dedicar en primer lugar este trabajo a mis compañeros y compañeras de la Asociación TOC 2.0 de Barcelona, de la cual tengo el honor de ser el asesor jurídico. Todos ellos demuestran una fortaleza y valentía digna de admiración.

Asimismo, esta dedicatoria se hace extensible a Aida Torres Pérez, mi tutora del trabajo. A pesar de haber tenido dificultades para estructurar el trabajo, ella siempre me ha dado los refuerzos positivos para que no abandonara durante el trayecto. También a Tomás Gabriel García Micó, mi mejor amigo y compañero de proyecto (Instituto de Salud Mental de la Abogacía); Marta Beatriz Luque Llaosa y Manuel Atserias Gracia, por haber confiado en mí; a Menna Jarque Margenat, el hermano que nunca he podido tener; a Beatriz Pérez Rodríguez y a Laia Carpena Pinilla, mis dos mejores amigas. Finalmente, a pesar de que ya no esté entre nosotros, también quiero dedicar este trabajo a Rosa Subirachs, una mujer admirable y fuerte. Allí donde estés, siempre te llevaré en mi corazón.

[2] De acuerdo con el artículo 45.1 de la CNUDPD, la entrada en vigor de este tratado internacional en España fue el 3 de mayo de 2008.

[3] De acuerdo con el artículo 13.1 del PFCNUDPD, la entrada en vigor de este tratado internacional en Espña fue el 3 de mayo de 2008.

[4] Este trabajo de investigación solo analiza el internamiento involuntario civil. Asimismo, también se excluye esta medida involuntaria cuando se aplica a menores y a personas con enfermedades que puedan afectar la capacidad cognitiva.

[5] Recommendation No.Rec(83)2 concerning the legal protection of persons suffering from mental disorder placed as involuntary patients, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 22 February 1983 at the 356th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.

[6] Recommendation No. REC(2004)10 concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorder and its Explanatory Memorandum, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 22 September 2004 at the 896th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.

[7] Recommendation 1235 (1994) regarding psychiatry and human rights, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 12 April 1994 at 10th Sitting.

[8] Recommendation 2091 (2016) regarding the case against a Council of Europe legal instrument on involuntary measures in psychiatry, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 22 April 2016 at 18th Sitting.

[9] GURBAI,MARTIN(2018, p.3): “There is no unified UN position on the question of whether involuntary placement and treatment can be lawful under UN human rights standards; different positions have been taken in different reports”.

[10] DH-BIO/INF (2015) 7: Working document concerning the protection of human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorder with regard to involuntary placement and involuntary treatment.

[11] Estas cuestiones están íntimamente relacionadas con el ámbito de análisis preferido del autor: la interpretación judicial. Atendiendo a su filosofía jurídica (originalismo de Antonin Scalia), la dificultad para justificar la incompatibilidad del internamiento involuntario y el tratamiento forzoso con el art. 5.1.e del CEDH ha sido notable. En este sentido, el autor parte de una premisa, la cual, queda reflejada en su trabajo “Why do I defend the resistance theory?” (ATSERIAS, 2017):

“As a judge, I could not distort the original meaning of the law. If I did not agree with the legal text, I would rather be a lawmaker to change it. Therefore, in my opinion, if someone wants to be a good judge, he or she will always defend originalism and textualism to resolve any legal dispute. Otherwise, this judge will undermine the principle of separation of powers, and accordingly, the democratic government will be at stake.

Some lawyers assert that constitutions evolve over time. In the US, some judges of the Supreme Court consider that their constitutional text must comport with «the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society». In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights establishes that the European Convention on Human Rights «is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions». Well, I cannot support this legal reasoning. Any constitution or international instrument has its amendment process. It is the only legal mechanism that respects democratic government. For this reason, when some judges try to identify these ‘evolving standards’ or ‘present-day conditions’, I ask myself: Why do judges must determine this evolution? That is not democratic, but rather a sort of imposition.”